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Using box-office data for all movies released between 1982 and 2000, I test the implications of a simple
model of social learning in which the consumption decisions of individuals depend on information
they receive from their peers. The model predicts different box office sales dynamics depending on
whether opening weekend demand is higher or lower than expected. I use a unique feature of the movie
industry to identify ex-ante demand expectations: the number of screens dedicated to a movie in its
opening weekend reflects the sales expectations held by profit-maximizing theater owners. Several
pieces of evidence are consistent with social learning. First, sales of movies with positive surprise
and negative surprise in opening weekend demand diverge over time. If a movie has better than expected
appeal and therefore experiences larger than expected sales in week 1, consumers in week 2 update
upward their expectations of quality, further increasing week 2 sales. Second, this divergence is small
for movies for which consumers have strong priors and large for movies for which consumers have
weak priors. Third, the effect of a surprise is stronger for audiences with large social networks. Finally,
consumers do not respond to surprises in first week sales that are orthogonal to movie quality, like
weather shocks. Overall, social learning appears to be an important determinant of sales in the movie
industry, accounting for 38% of sales for the typical movie with positive surprise. This implies the
existence of a large "social multiplier'' such that the elasticity of aggregate demand to movie quality
is larger than the elasticity of individual demand to movie quality.
Enrico Moretti






The goal of this paper is to test whether the consumption decisions of individuals depend
on information they receive from their peers when product quality is dicult to observe
in advance. I focus on situations where quality is ex-ante uncertain and consumers hold
a prior on quality, which they may update based on information from their peers. This
information may come from direct communication with peers who have already consumed
the good. Alternatively, it may arise from the observation of peers' purchasing decisions.
If every individual receives an independent signal of the goods quality, then the purchasing
decision of one consumer provides valuable information to other consumers, as individuals
use the information contained in others' actions to update their own expectations on quality.
This type of social learning is potentially relevant for many experience goods like movies,
books, restaurants, or legal services. Informational cascades are particularly important for
new products. For the rst few years of its existence, Google experienced exponential accel-
eration in market share. This acceleration, which displayed hallmarks of contagion dynamics,
was mostly due to word of mouth and occurred without any advertising on the part of Google
(Vise, 2005).
Social learning in consumption has enormous implications for rms. In the presence of
informational cascades, the return to attracting a new customer is dierent from the direct
eect that the customer has on prots. Attracting a new consumer has a multiplier eect on
prots because it may increase the demand of other consumers. The existence of this \social
multiplier" (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 2003) implies that, for a given good, the
elasticity of aggregate demand to quality is larger than the elasticity of individual demand
to quality. Furthermore, social learning makes the success of a product more dicult to
predict, as demand depends on (potentially random) initial conditions. Two products of
similar quality may have vastly dierent demand in the long run, depending on whether the
initial set of potential consumers happens to like the product or not.
Social learning has been extensively studied in theory (Bikhchandani et al., 1992 and
1998; Banerjee, 1992). But despite its tremendous importance for rms, the empirical ev-
idence is limited, because social learning is dicult to identify in practice. The standard
approach in the literature on peer eects and social interactions involves testing whether
an individual decision to purchase a particular good depends on the consumption decisions
and/or the product satisfaction of other individuals that are close, based on some metric.
Such an approach is dicult to implement in most cases. First, data on purchases of specic
goods by individual consumers are dicult to obtain. Second, because preferences are likely
to be correlated among peers, observing that individuals in the same group make similar
consumption decisions may simply reect shared preferences, not informational spillovers.
In observational data, it is dicult to isolate factors that aect some individuals' demand
for a good but not the demand of their peers.1
1Randomized experiments may oer a solution. Salganik et al. (2006) set up a web site for music
1In this paper, I focus on consumption of movies. Since individual-level data are not
available, I use market-level data to test the predictions of a simple model that characterizes
the diusion of information on movie quality following surprises in quality. In the model,
the quality of a movie is ex-ante uncertain, as consumers do not know for certain whether
they will like the movie or not.2 Consumers have a prior on quality{based on observable
characteristics of the movie such as the genre, actors, director, ratings and budget, etc.{and
they receive an individual-specic, unbiased signal on quality{which reects how much the
concept of a movie resonates with a specic consumer.
I dene social learning as a situation where consumers in week t update their prior based
on feedback from others who have seen the movie in previous weeks. The model predicts
dierent box oce sales dynamics depending on whether a movie's underlying quality is
better or worse than people's expectations. Because the signal that each consumer receives
is unbiased, movies that have better than expected underlying quality have stronger than
expected demand in the opening weekend (on average). In the presence of social learning,
they become even more successful over time, as people update upwards their expectations
on quality. On the other hand, movies that have worse than expected quality have weaker
than expected demand in the opening weekend (on average) and become even less successful
over time. In other words, social learning should make successful movies more successful
and unsuccessful movies more unsuccessful. By contrast, without social learning, there is
no updating of individual expectations, and therefore there should be no divergence in sales
over time.
Surprises in the appeal of a movie are key to the empirical identication. I use a unique
feature of the movie industry to identify ex-ante demand expectations: the number of screens
dedicated to a movie in its opening weekend reects the sales expectations held by the market.
The number of screens is a good summary measure of ex-ante demand expectations because it
is set by forward-looking, prot-maximizing agents{the theater owners{who have an incentive
to correctly predict rst week demand. The number of screens should therefore reect most
of the information that is available to the market before the opening on the expected appeal
of the movie, including actors, director, budget, ratings, advertising, reviews, competitors,
and every other demand shifter that is observed before opening day.3
While on average theaters predict rst week demand correctly, there are cases where
they underpredict or overpredict the appeal of a movie. Take, for example, the movie
\Pretty Woman" (1990). Before the opening weekend it was expected to perform well,
since it opened in 1325 screens, more than the average movie. But in the opening weekend it
downloading where users are randomly provided with dierent amount of information on other users' ratings.
Cai, Chen and Fang (2007) use a randomized experiment to study learning on menu items in restaurants.
2Throughout the paper, the term quality refers to consumers' utility. It has no reference to artistic value.
3Some empirical tests lend credibility to this assumption. For example, in a regression that has opening
weekend sales as dependent variable, the inclusion of very detailed set of movie characteristics{budget,
genre, ratings, date of release, distributor, etc.{add virtually no predictive power once number of screens is
controlled for.
2signicantly exceeded expectations, totalling sales of about $23 million. In this case, demand
was signicantly above what the market was expecting, presumably because the concept of
the movie or the look of Julia Roberts appealed to consumers more than one could have
predicted before the opening.
Using data on nation-wide sales by week for all movies released between 1982 and 2000,
I test ve empirical implications of the model.
(1) In the presence of social learning, sales trends for positive and negative surprise movies
should diverge over time. Consistent with this hypothesis, I nd that the decline over time
of sales for movies with positive surprise is substantially slower than the decline of movies
with negative surprise. This nding is robust to controlling for advertising expenditures and
critic reviews, and to a number of alternative specications. Moreover, the nding does not
appear to be driven by changes in supply or capacity constraints. For example, results are
not sensitive to using per-screen sales as the dependent variable instead of sales or dropping
movies that sell out in the opening weekend.
(2) The new information contained in peer feedback should be more important when
consumers have more diuse priors. When a consumer is less certain whether she is going
to like a specic movie, the additional information represented by peer feedback on movie
quality should have more of an eect on her purchasing choices relative to the case where
the consumer is more certain. In practice, to identify movies for which consumers have more
precise priors, I use a dummy for sequels. It is reasonable to expect that consumers have
more precise priors for sequels than non-sequels. Additionally, to generalize this idea, I use
the variance of the rst week surprise in box oce sales by genre. Genres with large variance
in rst week surprise are characterized by more uncertainty and therefore consumers should
have more diuse priors on their quality. Consistent with social learning, I nd that the
impact of a surprise on subsequent sales is signicantly smaller for sequels and signicantly
larger for genres that have a large variance in rst week surprise.
(3) Social learning should be stronger for consumers with a large social network and
weaker for consumers with a small social network. While I do not have a direct measure of
social network, I assume that teenagers have more developed social networks than adults.
Consistent with social learning, I nd that the eect of a surprise on subsequent sales is
larger for movies that target teenage audiences.
(4) Under social learning, surprises in opening weekend demand should only matter
insofar as they reect new information on movie quality. They should not matter when they
reect factors that are unrelated to movie quality, such as weather shocks. This prediction
is important because it allows one to separate social learning from a leading alternative
explanation of the evidence, the network eects hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that
the utility of watching a movie depends on the number of peers who have seen it or will
see it (for example, because people like discussing movies with friends). This implies that
each consumer's demand for a good depends directly on the demand of other consumers.
To distinguish between network eects and social learning, I isolate surprises in rst week
3sales that are caused by weather shocks. Under social learning, a negative surprise in rst
week demand due to bad weather should have no signicant impact on sales in the following
weeks. Weather is unrelated to movie quality and therefore should not induce any updating.
By contrast, under the network eect hypothesis, a negative surprise in rst week demand
for any reason, including bad weather, should lower sales in following weeks. Empirically, I
nd no signicant eect of surprises due to weather on later sales.
(5) Finally, the marginal amount of learning should decline over time, as more information
on quality becomes available. For example, the amount of updating that takes place in week
2 should be larger than the amount of updating that takes place in week 3 given what is
already known in week 2. Consistent with this prediction, I nd that sales trends for positive
surprise movies are concave, and sales trends for negative surprise movies are convex.
Overall, the ve implications of the model seem remarkably consistent with the data.
Taken individually, each piece of empirical evidence may not be sucient to establish the
existence of social learning. But taken together, the weight of the evidence supports the
notion of social learning.
My estimates suggest that the amount of sales generated by social learning is substantial.
A movie with stronger than expected demand has $5.8 million in additional sales relative to
the counterfactual where the quality of the movie is the same but consumers don't learn from
each other. This amounts to 38% of total revenues. From the point of view of the studios,
this implies the existence of a large multiplier. The total eect on prots of attracting an
additional consumer to see a given movie is signicantly larger than the direct eect on
prots, because that consumer, if satised with the quality of the movie, will increase her
peers' demand for the same movie.
Besides the substantive ndings specic to the movie industry, this paper seeks to make
a broader methodological contribution. It demonstrates that it is possible to identify social
interactions using aggregate data and intuitive comparative statics. In situations where
individual-level, exogenous variation in peer group attributes is not available, this approach
has the potential to provide a credible alternative for the identication of social interactions.
Possible additional applications include studying social learning in the demand for books
(where the size of the rst print provides a good measure of expected demand), music,
restaurants, cars or software. This paper is related to the earlier literature on technology
adoption, where diusion models similar to the one developed here were used to document
the spreading of new technologies based on peer imitation (Griliches, 1957; Bass 1969). A
similar approach has been applied in an interesting recent study of political presidential
primaries (Knight and Schi, 2007).4
4Knight and Schi (2007) nd that a stronger than expected performance of a candidate in an early voting
state leads voters in other states to update their priors. Examples of existing papers on social learning in
consumption include: Liu (2006), who studies word-of-mouth eects in movies by measuring Internet postings
on a Yahoo Web Site; De Vaney and Cassey (2001), who present an analysis of the dynamics of box oce
sales; Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Ikaheimo (2004), who use data on car purchases to estimate the eect of
4The paper proceeds as follows. In sections 2 and 3 I outline a simple theoretical model
and its empirical implications. In sections 4 and 5 I describe the data and the empirical
identication of surprises. In sections 6 and 7 I describe my empirical ndings. Section 8
concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Social Learning
In this section, I outline a simple framework that describes the eect of social learning
on sales. The idea{similar to the one adopted by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee
(1992){is very simple. Consumers do not know in advance how much they are going to like
a movie. Before the opening weekend, consumers share a prior on the quality of the movie{
based on its observable characteristics{and they receive a private, unbiased signal on quality,
which reects how much the concept of a movie resonates with a specic consumer. Expected
utility from consumption is a weighted average of the prior and the signal (where the weight
reects the relative precision of the prior and the signal). Since the consumers' private signal
is unbiased, high quality movies have on average a stronger appeal and therefore stronger
opening weekend sales, relative to low quality movies.
In week 2, consumers have more information, since they receive feedback from their peers
who have seen the movie in week 1. I dene social learning as the process by which individuals
use feedback from their peers to update their own expectations of movie quality. In the
presence of social learning, a consumers expectation of consumption utility is a weighted
average of the prior, the signal and peer feedback, where, as before, the weights reect
relative precisions. If a movie is better (worse) than expected, consumers in week 2 update
upward (downward) their expectations and therefore even more (less) consumers decide to
see the movie.
This setting generates the prediction that under social learning a movie whose demand
is unexpectedly strong (weak) in the opening weekend should do even better (worse) in the
following weeks. Without social learning, there is no reason for this divergence over time.
The setting also generates four additional comparative statics predictions that have to do
with the precision of the prior, the size of the social network, the functional form of movie
sales and the role of surprises that are orthogonal to quality.5
neighbors' purchase decisions; and Sorensen (2007), who uses a dataset of university employees to document
social learning in health plan choices. Hendricks and Sorensen (2007) use a clever identication strategy
based on new album releases to analyze the role of information in music purchases. Bertrand, Mullainathan
and Luttmer (2000) and Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) document social learning in welfare participation
and portfolio choices, respectively.
5One dierence with Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) is that they focus on the conditions
that generate wrong cascades, where a good of high quality is not purchased because the rst consumers
who consider the purchase receive a bad signal, and everybody else after them is aected by their decision.
Wrong equilibria are unlikely to be pervasive in my empirical application, because I use a large sample with
nation-wide data. While it is possible that some groups of friends end up in the wrong equilibrium, this is
5The focus of the paper is empirical. The purpose of this section is only to formalize a
simple intuition, not to provide a general theoretical treatment of social learning. Therefore,
the model is designed to be simple and to generate transparent and testable predictions to
bring to the data. I follow Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and take the timing of consumption
as exogenous. I purposely do not attempt to model possible generalizations such as strategic
behavior or the value of waiting to obtain more information (option value).
2.1 Sales Dynamics With No Social Learning
The utility that individual i obtains from watching movie j is
Uij = 

j + ij (1)
where 
j represents the quality of the movie for the average individual, and ij  N(0; 1
d)
represents how tastes of individual i for movie j dier from the tastes of the average individual.
I assume that 
j, and ij are unobserved. Given the characteristics of a movie that are ob-











j represents consumers' priors on how much they will like movie j. Specically,
the vector Xj includes the characteristics of movie j that are observable before its release,
including its genre, budget, director, actors, ratings, distribution, date of release, advertising,
etc.; and mj is the precision of the prior, which is allowed to vary across movies. The reason
for dierences in the precision of the prior is that the amount of information available to
consumers may vary across movies. For example, if a movie is a sequel, consumers may have
a tighter prior than if a movie is not a sequel.
Before the release of the movie, I assume that each individual also receives a noisy,
idiosyncratic signal of the quality of the movie:
sij = Uij + ij (3)
I interpret this signal as a measure of how much the concept of movie j resonates with
consumer i. I assume that the signal is unbiased within a given movie and is normally





The assumption that the prior and signal are unbiased is important because it ensures that,
while there is uncertainty for any given individual on the true quality of the movie, on
average individuals make the correct decisions regarding each movie. I also assume that ij
unlikely to be true systematically for the entire nation.
6and ij are i.i.d. and independent of each other and independent of 
j; that Xj, , mj, kj
and d are known to all the consumers; and that consumers do not share their private signal.
The normal learning model indicates that the expected utility of the representative con-
sumer in the opening weekend is a weighted average of the prior (X0
j) and the signal (sij),


















d+mj, and the subscript 1 on the expectation operator indicates that
the expectation is taken using the information available in week 1. When the prior is more
(less) precise than the signal, prospective consumers put more (less) weight on the prior.
I assume that a consumer decides to see a movie if her expected utility given what she
knows about the quality of the movie is higher than the cost:
E1[UijjX
0
j;sij] > qi1 (6)
The cost of going to the movie at time t, qit, may vary because it includes the opportunity
cost of time, which varies across individuals and over time. For example, going to the movies
may be very costly for a given individual if it conicts with a work dinner, but it may be
very cheap for the same individual on a dierent night. Similarly, the opportunity cost of
time may vary across individuals. I assume that qit = q +uit, where uit  N(0; 1
r) and i.i.d.6
If the population of potential consumers of this movie is N, the total number of tickets
sold in the opening weekend is a binomial random variable with mean NP1 and variance











where () is the standard normal cumulative function and j1 =
q
(1   !j)2(1=kj + 1=d)) + (1=r).
The term (
j   X0
j) measures the surprise. In particular, it measures the distance
between the true quality of the movie, 
j, and consumers' prior, X0
j. Compare two movies
with the same prior but with dierent true quality 
j. Imagine for example that the quality of
movie a is higher than its prior (
a > X0
a) and the opposite is true for movie b (
b < X0
b).
Equation 7 indicates that movie a will experience higher opening weekend sales than the
movie b. The reason is that the private signal received by consumers is unbiased, so that on
average consumers nd the better movie more attractive. If a movie sells well in the opening
6I assume that uit is independent of 
j, ij and ij. The assumption that uij is normal simplies the
analysis, but is not completely realistic, because it implies that the cost of the movie can be innitely low. An
alternative formulation that generates the same predictions involves assuming that the cost is xed (qit = q)
and allowing for time-varying, idiosyncratic shocks to the utility of a movie. For example, one could assume
that  in equation 1 varies over time: ijt.
7week it is because the movie is of good quality and therefore many people received a good
signal.
What happens to the number of tickets sold in the weeks after the opening weekend? In
the absence of social learning, consumers in week 2 and later weeks have exactly the same
information that consumers have in week 1. This implies that Pt = P1, for t  2. Therefore,
a movie that does surprisingly well in the rst week experiences sales above its expected
value, but the dierence between actual sales and expected sales remains constant over time.
This is represented as a parallel shift upward in the top panel of Figure 1. The amount of
sales each week is higher, but the two lines are parallel. The dierence in intercept between
a movie that has higher than expected quality (
j > X0
j), and a movie whose quality is as
expected (
j = X0









and is positive. The dierence is negative in the case of a movie that does surprisingly poorly
in the rst weekend. This case is represented by a parallel shift downward in the top panel
of Figure 1.
Note that sales are constant over time because I am implicitly assuming that consumers
may watch the same movie multiple times. This assumption greatly simplies the analysis.
Below I show that the qualitative implications of the model do not change when consumers
are assumed to see a movie only once, so that sales trend down over time.
2.2 Sales Dynamics With Social Learning
With social learning, consumers have more information in week 2 than they did in week
1, because they receive feedback from their peers. Specically, I assume that consumer i has
Ni peers. Of these Ni peers, ni see the movie in week 1 and communicate to consumer i
their ex-post utility: Upj, for p = 1;2;:::;ni, where p indexes peers. Consumer i uses these
feedbacks to obtain an estimate of quality and update her expected utility.
To extract information on quality from peers' feedback, consumer i needs to take into
account the fact that the set of peers from whom she receives feedback is selected. These
are the peers who ex-ante found the movie appealing enough that they decided to see it:
they tend to have a high signal spj.7 Consumer i receives a feedback from peer p only when
E1[UpjjX0
j;spj] > qp1 (equation 6). If she ignored this selection, and simply averaged the
feedbacks U1j;U2j;:::;Unj, consumer i would obtain a biased estimate of the quality of the
movie.
In this set up, there is information not only in feedback from peers who have seen the
movie, but also in the fact that some peers have decided not to see the movie. Since every
individual receives an independent signal on movie quality, the fact that some of her peers
have decided not to see the movie provides valuable additional information to consumer i.
In week 2, consumer i obtains an estimate of 
j from the observed U1j;U2j;:::;Unij and
the number of peers who have not seen the movie, by maximizing the following maximum







































where f(U;V ) is the joint density of Upj and V ; Vpj is a function of the utility that ex-ante
peer p is expected to gain: Vpj = !jX0
j + (1   !j)spj   up2; and  is the standard nor-
mal density.8 The maximum likelihood estimator in week 2 is unbiased and approximately
normal, Sij2  N(
j; 1
















The precision of the maximum likelihood estimator varies across individuals, because dif-
ferent individuals have dierent numbers of peers, Ni, and receive dierent numbers of
feedbacks, ni.10
In week 2, consumer i's best guess of how much she will like movie j is a weighted average
of the prior, her private signal, and the information that she obtains from her peers who











hj + kj + zi2
sij +
zi2




bi2+d.11 The key implication is that in week 2 the consumer has more information
relative to the rst week, and as a consequence the prior becomes relatively less important.12
In each week after week 2, more peer feedback becomes available. By iterating the normal


















9The maximum likelihood estimate is the value of 























. Although this expression cannot be solved analytically, it is clear
that the maximum likelihood estimate is less than the simple average of the utilities Upj reported by peers
who saw the movie. It is dampened by a \selection-correcting" term that increases with the fraction of peers
who did not see the movie.
10The term c is equal to (q   !jX0
j   (1   !j)
j)=V . Since E[xjx < c] =
(c)
(c) for a standard normal
variable x, it is clear that c >
(c)
(c), bi2 is always positive and the likelihood function is globally concave.
11The reason for having zi2 in this expression (and not bi2) is that the consumer is interested in predicting
Uij, not 
j. Therefore we need to take into account not just the precision of the ML estimator (bi2), but
also the precision of ij (d).
12To see this, compare the weight on the prior in equation 6,
hj
hj+kj, with the weight on the prior in
equation 10,
hj







































Three points are worth noting here. First, individuals receive new feedback each week,
and therefore the prior and the individual signal become less important over time and the
true lm quality becomes more important over time. It is clear from equation 12 that as t
grows, sales are determined less and less by X0
j, and more and more by 
j, because wj1t
declines over time and 1   wj1t increases over time. In the limit, when t is very large, the






Second, the marginal increase in information declines over time. For example, the increase
in information that a consumer experiences between week 1 and week 2 is larger than the
increase in information that a consumer experiences between week 2 and week 3, given the
information available in week 2. And the latter is larger than the increase in information
that a consumer experiences between week 3 and week 4, given the information available in
week 3. When t is small, the consumer has limited information on 
j and the additional
information provided by the maximum likelihood estimator based on peer feedbacks may be
signicant. But when t is large, the consumer has already obtained many estimates of 
j
so that the marginal information provided by an additional week is limited. Formally, the
weight on the prior not only declines but declines at a slowing rate:
@2wj1t
@t2 < 0.
Third, equation 9 makes clear that the larger the group of peers of individual i, Ni, the
more precise the estimate of quality available to individual i. This makes intuitive sense.
Having feedback from 20 peers is more informative than having feedback from 1 peer.
I am interested in characterizing the change over time in the probability that a consumer
decides to see a given movie as a function of the rst week surprise. For simplicity, consider
rst a movie whose ex-ante expected value is equal to its average cost: X0 = q. Three cases
are relevant:
(1) Positive Surprise. If the true quality of the movie is higher than the prior (
j >
X0
j), then sales in the opening weekend are higher than the case of no surprise, and they
grow over time. It is possible to show that
@Pt
@t





13The term jt is
q
w2
j2t(1=d + 1=kj) + (
Pt
s=2 zis)=(kj + hj +
Pt
s=2 zis)2 + 1=r.
10This is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. The intercept shifts upward, reecting the
fact that the movie is a positive surprise in the opening weekend. The positive slope reects
the fact that consumers in week 2 observe the utility of their peers in week 1 and infer that
the movie is likely to be better than their original expectation. Furthermore, while we know
from equation 11 that each passing week adds more information, the marginal value of this
information declines over time. It is possible to show that
@2Pt





This implies that the function that describes the evolution of ticket sales over time is concave.
(2) Negative Surprise. The opposite is true if the true quality of the movie is lower
than the prior (
j < X0
j). In this case the probability of seeing the movie is lower at the
opening weekend and declining over time:
@Pt
@t





This is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. Moreover, because the value of marginal
information declines over time, the function that describes ticket sales is convex in time:
@2Pt





(3) No Surprise. If the true quality of the movie is equal to the prior (
j = X0
j), then
the probability of going to see the movie is on average constant over time: Pt = P1. In this
case, there is no surprise regarding the quality of the movie and social learning has no eect
on ticket sales.
In the more general case where X0
j is not equal to q, the expression for the surprise
is more complicated, but the intuition is similar: for a given prior X0
j, a large enough 
j
is associated with an increase in intercept and a positive slope, while a small enough 
j is
associated with a decrease in intercept and a negative slope. Additionally, the inequalities
in equations 14 and 16 also generalize.
2.3 Extensions
Because the main goal of the paper is empirical, the above model is kept purposefully
simple. Here I informally discuss how the predictions of the model might change if two
assumptions are relaxed.
(1) No Repeated Purchases The simple model above assumes the utility of watching
a movie does not decline in the number of times a consumer watches it. As a result, it fails
to capture an important feature of the dynamics of movie ticket sales, namely that sales
of movies typically decline over time. I now consider the more realistic case in which most
consumers do not go to the same movie twice. This feature allows ticket sales for a given
11movie to decline over time. It complicates the analysis, but does not change the fundamental
intuition.
While the probability that the representative consumer sees a movie in week 1 is the
same P1 dened in equation 7, the probability for subsequent weeks changes. Consider rst
the case where there is no social learning. The probability that the representative consumer
sees the movie in week 2 is now the joint probability that her expected utility at t = 2
is higher than her cost and her expected utility at t = 1 is lower than her cost: P2 =
Prob(E1[UijjX0
j;sij] < qi1andE2[UijjX0
j;sij] > qi2). It is clear that P2 < P1. Intuitively,
many of the consumers who expect to like a given movie watch it during the opening weekend.
Those left are less likely to expect to like the movie, so that attendance in the second week
is weaker than in the rst.
The key point here is that, while all movies exhibit a decline in sales over time, this
decline is more pronounced for movies that experience strong sales in the rst weekend. In





A strong performance in week 1 reduces the base of potential customers in week 2. The
eect of this intertemporal substitution is that the decline in sales over time is accelerated
compared to the case of a movie that has an average performance in week 1, although the
total number remains higher because the intercept is higher. The opposite is true if a movie
is worse than expected. Both cases are represented in the top panel of Figure 2.
How do these predictions change with social learning? With social learning,
P2 = Prob(E2[UijjX0
j;sij;Sij2] > qi2 and E1[UijjX0
j;sij] < qi1)
= Prob(wj22(ij + ij) + wj32(Sij2   
j)   ui2) > (q   (1   wj12)
j   wj12X0
j)
and (wj21(ij + ij) + wj31(Sij1   
j)   ui1) < (q   (1   wj11)
j   wj11X0
j))
The answer depends on the strength of the social learning eect. If social learning is weak,
the dynamics of sales will look qualitatively similar to the ones in the top panel of Figure 2,
although the slope of the movie characterized by a positive (negative) surprise is less (more)
negative. But if social learning is strong enough, the dynamics of sales will look like the
ones in the bottom part of Figure 2, where the slope of the movie characterized by a positive
(negative) surprise is less (more) negative than the slope of the average movie.
(2) Option Value. In my setting I follow Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and model
the timing of purchase as exogenous. This greatly simplies the model. In each period,
individuals decide whether to see a particular movie by comparing its expected utility to
the opportunity cost of time, qit, assumed to be completely idiosyncratic. This assumption
is not completely unrealistic, because it says that individuals have commitments in their
lives (such as work or family commitments) that are not systematically correlated with the
opening of movies. On the other hand, it ignores the possibility that consumers might want
12to wait for uncertainty to be resolved before making a decision.
In the case of the latter possibility, consumers would have an expected value of waiting
to decide, as in the Dixit and Pindyck (1994) model of waiting to invest. This would give
rise to an option value associated with waiting. Like in the myopic case described above,
a consumer in this setting decides to see the movie in week 1 only if her private signal on
quality is high enough relative to the opportunity cost of time. However, the signal that
triggers consumption in the option value case is higher than its equivalent in the myopic
case, because waiting generates information and therefore has value. This implies a lower
probability of going to see the movie in week 1.
If ij and qit remain independent of all individual and movie characteristics, and indi-
viduals take their peers' timing as given, the model generates the same set of implications.
While decisions are more prudent in the strategic case than in the myopic case, the timing
of purchase remains determined by the realization of the signal and of qit, and thus remains
unsystematic. Therefore, information diusion follows similar dynamics to those described
above.14
3 Empirical Predictions
The model above has several testable predictions that I bring to the data in sections 6
and 7.
1. In the presence of strong enough social learning, sales of movies with stronger than
expected opening weekend demand and sales of movies with weaker than expected
opening weekend demand should diverge over time. This prediction is shown in Figures
1 and 2 and follows from equations 13 and 15. In the absence of social learning, or
with weak social learning, we should see no divergence over time or even convergence.
2. In the presence of social learning, the eect of a surprise should be stronger for movies
with a more diuse prior and weaker for movies with a more precise prior. Intuitively,
when a consumer has a precise idea of whether she is going to like a specic movie
(strong prior), the additional information provided by her peers should matter less
relative to the case when a consumer has only a vague idea of how much she is going
to like a movie (weak prior). Formally, this is evident from equation 11. A more
precise prior (a larger hj) implies a larger !j1t, and therefore a smaller !j3t (everything
else constant). This means that with a more precise prior, the additional information
provided by the peers, Sijs, will receive less weight, while the prior, X0
j, will receive
more weight. In the absence of social learning, there is no particular reason for why
14A more complicated scenario arises if timing of purchase strategically depends on peers' timing. This
could happen, for example, if some individuals wait for their friends to go see the movie in order to have
a more precise estimate of their signal, and their peers wait for the same reason. This scenario might have
dierent implications and is outside the scope of the paper.
13the correlation between sales trend and rst week surprise should vary systematically
with precision of the prior.
3. In the presence of social learning, the eect of a surprise should be stronger for con-
sumers who have larger social networks. The idea is that receiving feedback from 20
peers is more informative than receiving feedback from 2 peers. Formally, this is clear
from equations 9 and 11. Equation 9 shows that a larger Ni implies a more precise esti-
mate of movie quality based on peer feedback (i.e. a smaller variance of Sijt). In turn,
equation 11 indicates that a smaller variance of Sijt implies a larger !j3t and smaller
!j1t and !j2t. In the absence of social learning, there is no particular reason for why
the correlation between sales trend and rst week surprise should vary systematically
with size of the social network.
4. In the presence of social learning, the marginal eect of a surprise on sales should
decline over time. For example, the amount of updating that takes place in week 2
should be larger than the amount of updating that takes place in week 3 given what is
already known in week 2. The implication is that the pattern of sales of movies with a
positive (negative) surprise should be concave (convex) in time. This is evident from
equations 14 and 16. In the absence of social learning, there is no particular reason for
why the curvature of sales over time should vary systematically with the sign of rst
week surprise.
5. In the presence of social learning, consumers should only respond to surprises that
reect new information on movie quality. They should not update their priors based
on surprises that reect factors other than movie quality. For example, consider the
case of a movie whose opening weekend demand is weaker than expected because of
bad weather. In this case, low demand in rst week does not imply that the quality of
the movie is low. Therefore, low demand in the rst week should not lead consumers
to update and should have no negative impact on subsequent sales.15 In the absence
of social learning, there is no particular reason for why variation in rst week demand
due to surprises in movie quality and variation in rst week demand due to factors
unrelated to quality should have dierent eects on sales trends.
4 Data
I use data on box oce sales from the rm ACNielsen-EDI. The sample includes all
movies that opened between 1982 and 2000 for which I have valid sales and screens data.16
15Formally, one can think of weather shocks as part of the cost of going to see the movie, uit. In the case
of bad weather in the opening weekend, ui1 is high for many consumers.
16I drop from the sample movies for which sales or number of screens are clearly misreported. In particular,
I drop movies that report positive sales in a week, but zero number of screens, or vice-versa. I am interested
14Beside total box oce sales by movie and week, it reports production costs, detailed genre
classication, ratings and distributor. I have a total of 4,992 movies observed for 8 weeks.
Total sample size is therefore 4;992  8 = 39;936. This dataset was previously used in
Goettler and Leslie (2005).
I augment box oce sales data with data on advertising and critic reviews. Unfortunately,
these data are available only for a limited number of years. Data on TV advertising by movie
and week were purchased from the rm TNS Media Intelligence. They include the totality
of TV advertising expenditures for the years 1995 to 2000. Data on movie reviews were hand
collected for selected years and newspapers by a research assistant. The exact date of the
review and an indicator for whether the review is favorable or unfavorable were recorded.
These data were collected for The New York Times for the movies opening in the years 1983,
1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999; for The Wall Street Journal, USA Today,
The Chicago Sun-Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution and
The Houston Chronicle for the movies opening in the years 1989, 1997 and 1999; and for
The San Francisco Chronicle for the movies opening in the years 1989, 1993, 1995 and 1997
and 1999.
Summary statistics are in Table 1. The average movie has box oce sales equal to $1.78
million in the average week. Box oce sales are higher in the opening weekend: $3.15 million.
Production costs amount to $4.54 million. All dollar gures are in 2005 dollars. The average
movie is shown on 449 screens on average and on 675 screens in the opening weekend. The
average movie has $6.85 million in cumulative TV advertising expenditures. About half of
the reviews are favorable. The bottom of the table shows the distribution of movies across
genres. Comedy, drama and action are the three most common genres.
The top panel in Figure 3 plots the typical evolution of box oce sales over time. The
gure shows a steep decline in the rst few weeks and a slowing down in the rate of decline
in the following weeks. The bottom panel in Figure 3 shows the evolution of log sales. The
gure shows that the decline in sales is remarkably log linear. This is convenient, because
the use of log-linear models will simply the empirical analysis.
Not all movies have positive sales for the entire 8 week period. Because the dependent
variable in the econometric models will be in logs, this potentially creates a selection problem.
To make sure that my estimates are not driven by the potentially non-random selection of
poorly performing movies out of the sample, throughout the paper I report estimates where
the dependent variable is the log of sales +$1. The main advantage of this specication is
that it uses a balanced panel: all movies have non-missing values for each of the 8 weeks.
(I have also re-estimated my models using the selected sample that has positive sales and
found generally similar results.)
in movies that are released nationally. Therefore, I drop movies that open only in New York and Los Angeles.
155 Identication of Surprise in Opening Week Demand
The rst step in testing the predictions of the model is to empirically identify surprise
in opening weekend sales. I dene the surprise as the dierence between realized box oce
sales and predicted box oce sales in the opening weekend, and I use the number of screens
in the opening weekend as a sucient statistic for predicted sales. Specically, I use the
residual from a regression of rst week log sales on log number of screens as my measure of
movie-specic surprise. (In some specications, I also control for genre, ratings, distribution,
budget and time of release.)
Number of screens is arguably a valid measure of the ex-ante expectations of demand for
a given movie because it is set by prot-maximizing agents (the theater owners), who have
a nancial incentive to correctly predict consumer demand for a movie. Number of screens
should therefore summarize the market expectation of how much a movie will sell based on
all information available before opening day: cast, director, budget, advertising before the
opening weekend, the quality of reviews before the opening weekend, the buzz in blogs, the
strength of competitors, and any other demand shifter that is observed by the market before
the opening weekend.
Deviations from this expectation can therefore be considered a surprise. These deviations
reect surprises in how much the concept of a movie and its cast resonate with the public.
While theaters seem to correctly guess demand for movies on average, there are cases where
the appeal of a movie and therefore its opening weekend demand is higher or lower than
expected. These surprises are the ones used in this paper for identication.17 Formally,
theaters seek to predict P1 in equation 7. It is easy to show that in the case of a positive
surprise in quality{i.e. when a movie true quality is higher than the prior (
j > X0
j){
theaters' prediction, ^ P1 is lower than realized sales: ^ P1 < P1. The opposite is true in the
case of a negative surprise{i.e. when a movie true quality is lower than the prior (
j < X0
j).
In this latter case, ^ P1 > P1.18
Column 1 in Appendix Table A1 shows that the unconditional regression of log sales in
17The data suggests that the number of screens set in the rst weekend by theaters is on average exactly
proportional to consumers' demand. A regression of log screens in the rst weekend on log sales in the rst
weekend should yield a coecient close to 1 if the theaters' prediction is correct on average. Empirically,
this regression yields a coecient equal to 1.01 (.004). Thus, if the actual demand for movie a in the opening
weekend is 10% higher than the demand for movie b, the number of screens in the opening weekend is on
average 10% higher for movie a than movie b.
18To see why, assume that theaters have the same information as consumers and use this information to
predict P1 in equation 7. The terms !j, X0
j, q and j1 are known, but 
j is unknown. Assume that theaters




j+(1 wj)sij where wj = mj=(aj+mj)
and aj = (dkj)=(d + kj). The weight on the prior used by theaters (wj) is dierent from the weight on the
prior used by consumers (!j in equation 5). In particular, it is easy to see that wj > !j. This implies that
even if consumers and theaters have the same information, theaters put more weight on the prior and less on
their private signal. Intuitively, this is because theaters seek to predict 
j while consumers seek to predict
Uij.
16rst weekend on log screens in rst weekend yields a coecient equal to .89 (.004), with R2
of .907. This regression is estimated on a sample that includes one observation per movie (N
= 4,992). The R2 indicates that about 90% of the variation in rst week sales is predicted by
theater owners. Thus, about 10% of the variation cannot be predicted by theater owners.19
Columns 2 to 7 show what happens to the predictive power of the model as I include
an increasingly rich set of covariates. If my assumption is correct and number of screens is
indeed a good summary measure of all the information that the market has available on the
likely success of a movie, the inclusion of additional covariates should have limited impact
on R2. In column 2, the inclusion of 16 dummies for genre has virtually no impact, as R2
increases from .907 to .908. Similarly, the inclusion of production costs and 8 dummies for
ratings raises R2 only marginally, from .908 to .912. Including 273 dummies for the identity
of the distributor, 12 dummies for months, 56 dummies for week, 6 dummies for weekday
and 18 dummies for year raises R2 to .937. Overall, it is safe to say that the addition of
all available controls has a limited impact on the t of the model once number of screens is
controlled for.
Appendix Table A2 shows the distribution of surprises in the opening weekend box oce
sales, together with some examples of movies. For example, the entry for 75% indicates that
opening weekend sales for the movie at the 75th percentile are 46% higher than expected.
The distribution appears symmetric, and it is centered around 0.02. Since surprise is a
regression residual, its mean is zero by construction.
An example of a movie characterized by large positive surprise is \The Silence of the
Lambs". Before the opening weekend, it was expected to perform well, since it opened
on 1479 screens, substantially above the average movie. But in the opening weekend, it
signicantly exceeded expectations, totalling sales of about $25 million. In this case, sales
were signicantly higher than the amount theaters were expecting based on the screens
assigned to it. Other examples of movies that experienced signicant positive surprises are
\Ghostbusters," \Sister Act" and \Breakin." More typical positive surprises are represented
by movies in the 75th percentile of the surprise distribution, such as \Alive," \Who Framed
Roger Rabbit" and \House Party." For many movies, the demand in the rst week is close to
market expectations. Examples of movies close to the median include \Highlander 3," \The
Bonre of the Vanities," \The Sting 2," and \A Midsummer Night's Dream." Examples of
19There is ample evidence that the movie industry is focused on opening weekend box oce sales. There
are countless newspaper articles and web sites devoted to predictions of opening weekend box oce sales,
and at least two web sites that allow betting on opening weekend box oce sales. (Unfortunately, betting
sites did not exist during the period for which I have sales data.) This attention to opening weekend box
oce sales is consistent with the notion that demand is uncertain, even just days before the opening. During
production, studios do use focus groups to determine which aspects of the story are more likely to resonate
with the public and how to best tailor advertising to dierent demographic groups. The unpredictable
component of demand that I focus on here is very dierent in nature, as it takes place just before release.
I am not aware of focus group analysis performed after production and marketing are completed to predict
rst weekend sales.
17negative surprise include \Home Alone 3," \Pinocchio," \Lassie," and \The Phantom of the
Opera." These four movies opened on a large number of screens (between 1,500 and 1,900),
but had rst weekend box oce sales lower than one would expect based on the number
of screens. Interestingly, there are two very dierent versions of Tarzan movies. One is an
example of a strong negative surprise (\Tarzan and the Lost City"), while the second one is
a strong positive surprise (\Tarzan").
One might wonder whether theaters might nd it protable to set the number of screens
not equal to the expected demand. For example, would it be optimal to systematically
lower the number of screens to articially boost surprise in rst week demand? It seems
unlikely. First, consumers would probably discount systematic underscreening and would
adjust their expectations accordingly. More fundamentally, number of screens is simply a
summary measure that I use to quantify expectations on demand. In my model, consumers'
expected utility is based on movie underlying characteristics (director, actors, genre, etc.)
as well as their private signal. For a given set of movie characteristics and for a given
signal, manipulation of the number of screens would have no impact on consumer demand.
The reason is that consumers in week 2 do not respond causally to surprises in rst week
demand. They respond causally only to variation in movie quality. Manipulating surprises
in rst week demand without changing actual movie quality is unlikely to generate higher
demand and higher prots.
6 Empirical Evidence
I now present empirical tests of the ve implications of the model described in section 3.
I begin in sub-section 6.1 with tests of prediction 1. In subsection 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4, I present
tests of predictions 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Later, in Section 7 I discuss the interpretation
of the evidence and I present a test of prediction 5.
6.1 Prediction 1: Surprises and Sale Dynamics
Graphical Evidence. The main implication of the model is that in the presence of
social learning, movies with a positive surprise in rst weekend sales should have a slower
rate of decline in sales than movies with a negative surprise in rst weekend sales (prediction
1). In the absence of social learning, movies with a positive and negative surprise should
have the same rate of decline in sales.
Figure 4 shows a graphical test of this prediction based on the raw data. It shows
unconditional average log sales by week and surprise status. The upper line represents the
decline in average sales for movies with a positive surprise, and the bottom line represents
the decline for movies with a negative surprise. The pattern shown in the Figure is striking.
Consistent with Prediction 1, movies with a positive surprise experience a slower decline
in sales than movies with a negative surprise. As a consequence, the distance between
18the average sales of positive and negative surprise movies is relatively small in the opening
weekend, but increases over time. After 8 weeks the dierence is much larger than in week
1.
Baseline Estimates. To test whether the dierence in slopes between positive and
negative surprise movies documented in Figure 4 is statistically signicant, I estimate models
of the form
lnyjt = 0 + 1t + 2(t  Sj) + dj + ujt (18)
where lnyjt is the log of box oce sales in week t; Sj is surprise or an indicator for positive
surprise; and dj is a movie xed eect. Identication comes from the comparison of the
change over time in sales for movies with a positive and a negative surprise. To account for
the possible serial correlation of the residual within a movie, standard errors are clustered
by movie throughout the paper.
The coecient of interest is 2. A nding of 2 > 0 is consistent with the social learning
hypothesis, since it indicates that the rate of decline of sales of movies with positive surprise
is slower than the rate of decline of sales of movies with negative surprise, as in Figure 4. A
nding of 2 = 0, on the other hand, is inconsistent with the social learning hypothesis, since
it indicates that the rate of decline of sales of movies with positive and negative surprise is
the same.20
It is important to note that the interpretation of 2 is not causal. The model in section
2 claries that, under social learning, a stronger than expected demand in week 1 does not
cause a slower decline in sales in the following weeks. A stronger than expected demand in
week 1 simply indicates (to the econometrician) that the underlying quality of the movie is
better than people had expected. It is the fact that movie quality is better than expected
and the diusion of information about movie quality that cause the slower decline in sales
in the weeks following a positive surprise in rst week demand. A positive surprise in rst
week demand is simply a marker for better than expected quality.
Estimates of variants of equation 18 are in Table 2. In column 1, I present the coecient
from a regression that only includes a time trend. This quanties the rate of decay of sales for
the average movie, shown graphically in the bottom panel in Figure 3. The entry indicates
that the coecient on t is -.926. In column 2, the regression includes the time trendsurprise,
with surprise dened as the residual from a regression of log sales on number of screens,
indicators for genre, ratings, production cost, distribution, week, month, year and weekday.
(This denition of surprise is the one used in column 7 of Table A1.) The coecient 2
from this regression is equal to .46 and is statistically dierent from zero. Since the variable
\surprise" has by construction mean zero, the coecient on t is the same in column 1 and 2.
20Because S is estimated, it contains some error. Estimates of 2 are therefore biased toward zero, and
the reported standard errors should in theory be adjusted to reect this additional source of variability.
Also, because t is predetermined, the following model yields the same estimates of 1 and 2: lnyjt =
0 + 1t + 2(t  Sj) + 3Sj + ujt.
19In column 3, Sj is an indicator for whether surprise is positive. The entry for 2 quanties
the dierence in rate of decay between positive and negative surprise movies shown graph-
ically in Figure 4. The entry indicates that the rate of decline for movies with a negative
surprise is -1.25, while the rate of decline for movies with a positive surprise is about half as
big:  1:25 + :619 =  :63. This dierence between positive and negative surprise movies is
both statistically and economically signicant.
In column 4, I divide the sample into three equally sized groups depending on the mag-
nitude of the surprise, and I allow for the rate of decline to vary across terciles. Compared
to the model in column 3, this specication is less restrictive because it allows the rate of
decline to vary across three groups, instead of two. I nd that the rate of decline is a mono-
tonic function of surprise across these three groups. The coecient for the rst tercile (most
negative surprise) is -1.32. The coecient for the second tercile (zero or small surprise) is
-.98. The coecient for the third tercile (most positive surprise) is -.47.
To better characterize the variation in the rate of decline of sales, I estimate a more
general model that allows for a movie-specic decline:
lnyjt = 0 + 1jt + dj + ujt (19)
where the rate of decline 1j is now allowed to vary across movies. Table 2 has already
established that the mean rate of decline of positive surprise movies is larger the mean rate
of decline of negative surprise movies. I use estimates of 1j in equation 19 to compare
the entire distribution of movie-specic slopes for positive and negative surprise movies, as
opposed to just the rst moment. This specication is therefore more general than the
models in Table 2, because it does not force the rate of decline to be the same with group.
Figure 5 and Table 3 show the distribution of the coecients 1j separately for positive
and negative surprise movies. It is clear that the distribution of the slope coecients for
movies with a positive surprise is more to the right than the distribution of the slope co-
ecients for movies with a negative surprise, as predicted by the model. For example, the
25th percentile, the median and the 75th percentile are -.96, -.41 and -.11 for positive surprise
movies, and -1.91, -1.23 and -.60 for negative surprise movies.
Advertising. One might be concerned that the dierence in sales trends between pos-
itive and negative surprise movies may be caused by changes in advertising expenditures
induced by the surprise. If studios initially set their optimal advertising budget based on the
expected performance of a movie, then it is plausible that a surprise in actual performance
will change their rst order conditions. In particular, if studios adjust their advertising ex-
penditures based on rst week surprise, estimates in Table 2 may be biased, although the
sign of the bias is a priori undetermined.21
21The sign of the bias depends on whether the marginal advertising dollar raises revenues more for positive
or negative surprise movies.
20In practice, endogenous changes in advertising do not appear to be a major factor in
explaining my results. First, most advertising takes place before the release of a movie,
primarily because studios{who are responsible for most advertising|receive a higher share
of prots from earlier weeks than later weeks. In my sample, 94% of TV advertising occurs
before the opening day. Thus, the majority of advertising should already be reected in the
number of screens and therefore should not enter surprise.
Second, and most importantly, directly controlling for advertising does not signicantly
aect estimates. This is shown in the top panel of Table 4. As explained in the data section,
advertising data are not available for all movies. For convenience, columns 1 and 2 report
baseline estimates of equation 18, reproduced from columns 2 and 3 of Table 2. Columns
3 and 4 report estimates of the same models obtained using the sub-sample of movies for
which I have advertising data. The comparison of columns 1 and 2 with columns 3 and 4
suggests that the sub-sample of movies for which I have ad data generates estimates that
are qualitatively similar to the full sample estimates. In columns 5 and 6, I use the sample
used for columns 3 and 4 and include a control for TV advertising. Specically, I control for
the logarithm of cumulative total expenditures for television advertising until the relevant
week.22
The comparison of columns 5 and 6 with columns 3 and 4 suggests that the inclusion of
controls for TV advertising has limited impact on my estimates. Specically, the coecients
on time and time  surprise change from -.940 and .700 (column 3) to -.996 and .661 (column
5), respectively. The coecients on time and time  an indicator for surprise change from -
1.320 and .777 (column 4) to -1.329 and .730 (column 6), respectively. Increases in advertising
expenditures are associated with sizable increases in box oce sales. The coecient on log
advertising is between .9 and 1.1, indicating that the elasticity of box oce sales relative
to cumulative advertising expenditures is close to 1. My data on advertising also identify
specic types of TV ads. For example, the data separately report expenditures for cable,
network, spot, and others. I have re-estimated columns 5 and 6 allowing for separate eects
for each type of ad and found estimates very similar to the ones reported.
I also note that even if advertising could explain the slower decline in sales for positive
surprise movies, it does not explain the comparative statics results on the precision of the
prior and the size of the social network that I describe in sub-sections 6.2 and 6.3 below.
Critic Reviews. Another potentially important omitted variable is represented by critic
reviews. The concern is that movie critics react to a surprise in opening weekend by covering
unexpected successes. This could have the eect of boosting sales for positive surprise movies,
22Cumulative expenditures for advertising for movie j in week t represent the sum of expenditures for all
TV ads broadcasted for movie j until week t. The reason for using cumulative expenditures, as opposed to
current expenditures, is that the demand in week t presumably depends both on ads in week t and ads in
earlier weeks. I have experimented with alternative specications. For example, in models where advertising
is dened as the sum of ad expenditures in the previous 1, 2, 3 or 4 weeks, results are very similar.
21thus generating the dierence in rate of decline between positive and negative surprise movies
documented above. Like advertising, the majority of reviews take place before the release of
a movie. In my data, 85% of newspaper reviews are published at or before the date of the
opening.
Directly controlling for positive reviews does not aect estimates signicantly. This is
shown in the bottom panel of Table 4. As for advertising, data on reviews are available only
for a subset of movies. Columns 1 and 2 report baseline estimates reproduced from Table 2.
In columns 3 and 4 I report estimates of the baseline model obtained using the sub-sample
for which I have data on reviews. In columns 5 and 6, I control for the cumulative share of
reviews that are favorable as a fraction of all the reviews published until the relevant week.
The comparison of columns 5 and 6 with columns 3 and 4 suggests that the inclusion of
controls reviews has limited impact on my estimates. The coecients on time and time 
surprise change from -.856 and .509 (column 3) to -.927 and .494 (column 5), respectively.
The coecients on time and time  an indicator for surprise change from -1.163 and .603
(column 4) to -1.227 and .582 (column 6), respectively. The coecient on favorable reviews
is positive and signicantly dierent from zero, although it can not necessarily be inter-
preted causally. I have also re-estimated the models in columns 5 and 6 separately for each
newspaper and found similar results.23
Like for advertising, I also note that if the only reason for a slow-down in the rate of
decline of positive surprise movies were critic reviews, we would not necessarily see the
comparative statics results on the precision of the prior and size of the social network that
I describe in subsections 6.2 and 6.3 below.
Supply Eects. So far, I have implicitly assumed that all the variation in sales reects
consumer demand. However, it is possible that changes in the availability of screens aect
sales. Consider the case where there is no social learning, but some theater owners react to
the rst week surprise by adjusting the movies they screen. This type of supply eect has the
potential to aect sales, especially in small towns, where the number of screens is limited.
For example, in week 2 a theater owner in a small town may decide to start screening a
movie that had a positive surprise elsewhere, thereby increasing the number of customers
who have access to that movie.
This is important because it implies that the evidence in Table 2 may be explained not
23Specically, the coecients on time and time  surprise for USA Today are -.83 (.03) and .60 (.04)
without controls (column 3); and -.83 (.03) and .59 (.04) controlling for favorable reviews (column 5). For
the Wall Street Journal are: -.70 (.05), .46 (.07) without controls and -.72 (.05) and .45 (.07) with controls.
For the New York Times: -.85 (.02) and .50 (.03) without controls; -.86 (.02) and .51 (.02) with controls. For
the Los Angeles Times: -.83 (.03) and .51 (.03) without controls; -.84 (.03) and .51 (.03) with controls. For
the San Francisco Chronicle: -.81 (.03) and .56 (.03) without controls; -.87 (.03) and .54 (.03) with controls.
For the Atlanta Journal Constitution: -.86 (.04) and .60 (.04) without controls; -.91 (.04) and .58 (.04) with
controls. For the Houston Chronicle: -.82 (.03) and .58 (.03) without controls; -.87 (.03) and .56 (.03) with
controls.
22by learning on the part of consumers, but by learning on the part of theater owners. To test
for this possibility, I have re-estimated my models using sales per screen as the dependent
variable. In this specication, the focus is on changes in the average number of viewers
for a given number of screens. These results are therefore not aected by changes in the
number of theaters screening a given movie. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 correspond to a
specication where Sj is the surprise of movie j, while columns 2 and 4 correspond to a
specication where Sj is a dummy for whether the surprise of movie j is positive. Overall,
estimates of the eect of a surprise are qualitatively robust to the change in the denition of
the dependent variable, although the magnitude of the eect declines relative to the baseline.
For example, entries in column 2 indicate that the rate of decline of a positive and negative
surprise movie are -.64 and -1.25, respectively. The corresponding rates of decline in column
4 are -.52 and -.80. In other words, in column 2 the rate of decline of a positive surprise
movie is only half of the rate of decline of a negative surprise movie, while in column 4 the
rate of decline of a positive surprise movie is 65% of the rate of decline of a negative surprise
movie.
Note that the interpretation of this specication requires caution. Number of screens is
an endogenous variable, which presumably adjusts as a function of demand shocks. If there
is social learning, a positive surprise in week 1 will result in an increase in demand in the
following weeks, and, as a consequence, it will also cause an increase in the number of screens
devoted to that particular movie. While the specication in Table 5 is helpful in testing for
the possibility of supply eects, it is not my preferred specication because, by focusing in
sales per screen, it discards useful variation in the dependent variable.
I also note that an increase in number of screens alone would not explain the dierence
in the eect of surprise for teen movies and non-teen movies that I document below in
sub-section 6.3.
Sold-out Movies. Another possible interpretation of Table 2 is that the slower decline
in sales for positive surprise movies reects sold out movies, not social learning. Suppose for
example that demand in week 1 exceeds capacity and that some of this excess demand gets
shifted to later weeks. To test this possibility directly, I re-estimate equation 18 excluding
movies that might have sold out. In particular, I re-estimate my models dropping movies
that are in the top 1%, 3% or 5% of the per-screen attendance distribution. Estimates in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 5{obtained by dropping movies that are in the top 5% of the
per-screen attendance distribution{indicate that results are robust to this specication.
Furthermore, this alternative explanation is not consistent with the comparative statics
on precision of the prior and of the signal documented in sub-sections 6.2 and 6.3 below. If
the only thing driving results is that some positive surprise movies are sold out, we should
not expect to see the eect of surprise vary systematically with the precision of the prior.
Robustness. Here I probe the robustness of estimates in Table 2 using two sets of
23alternative specications. First, I investigate whether my estimates are sensitive to changes
in the denition of surprise. In Table 2, surprise was the residual in a regression of log sales
on number of screens and controls, including 16 dummies for genre, 8 dummies for ratings,
cost of production, and controls for timing of the opening (18 dummies for year, 12 dummies
for month, 52 dummies for week of the year, and 7 dummies for day of the week). If number
of screens is a good measure of the market expectations of the demand for a movie, the
presence of these additional covariates should have no eect on estimates. Panel 1 of Table
6 shows that this is indeed the case.
I report estimates of 2 when surprise is dened as the residual from a regression of rst
weekend log sales on the log of number of screens in the opening weekend and a varying
set of controls. The table shows that alternative denitions of surprise yield very similar
estimates of the coecient 2. For example, in column 1 surprise is dened as the residual in
a regression of sales on number of screens only. The point estimates are .422 in model 1 and
.672 in model 2. These estimates dier only slightly from the baseline estimates in Table 2,
which are .463 and .616, respectively and are reproduced in column 7. Adding controls for
genre, ratings, production costs and exact time of release also has limited impact. Overall,
it appears that the estimates of 2 are not very sensitive to which controls are included in
the denition of surprise.
As a second check, I investigate whether estimates are sensitive to the addition of controls
in equation 18 (holding xed the denition of surprise). All time-invariant movie charac-
teristics are fully absorbed in this equation by movie xed eects, but one might still be
concerned that the rate of decline diers across movies and is correlated with surprise. For
example, one might be concerned that the rate of decline for, say, adventure movies is slow,
and at the same time adventure movies tend to have positive surprises. I do not expect this
to be a likely scenario. If screens are indeed a good measure of market expectations, they
should account for all systematic dierences across genres and other movie characteristics.
To address this concern, I investigate whether estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of
an increasing number of lm characteristics interacted with time trends
lnyjt = 0 + 1t + 2(t  Sj) + 3(t  Xj) + dj + ujt (20)
where Xj includes genre, ratings, production costs, distributor, and date of the release (year,
month, day of the week); and surprise is based only on number of screens. In this model, any
systematic dierences in the rate of decline in sales across dierent genres, ratings, costs,
distributors and time of release is accounted for.24
Panel 2 of Table 6 indicates that estimates are robust to the inclusion of these additional
controls. For example, the model in column 2 controls for a genre-specic rate of decline in
sales. Identication of 2 arises because surprises vary within genre. The coecients, .422
24Note that if I included all the controls in the denition of surprise, then the addition of controls in the
sales equation would have no eect on the coecient 2. The reason is that any correlation between controls
and surprise has already been purged the inclusion of controls in the surprise equation.
24and .671, are remarkably similar to the baseline coecients. The models in columns 3 to
7 allow the rate of decline to vary depending on ratings, budget, distributor and time of
release. The coecients do not change signicantly.
6.2 Prediction 2: Precision of the Prior
The evidence uncovered so far seems consistent with one of the predictions of the social
learning hypothesis. But if such evidence is indeed explained by social learning, there are
several additional implications that one should see in the data. In the rest of this section
and in the next one, I test four additional implications of the social learning hypothesis.
Prediction 2 indicates that social learning should matter more for movies with a diuse
prior than for movies with a precise prior. The intuition is simple. When consumers have a
precise prior, they have a good ex-ante idea of whether they might like a movie, irrespective
of what their friends may say. In this case, the new information represented by the rst
week surprise should have a limited impact on their choices. When consumers have a diuse
prior, on the other hand, they only have a vague idea as to whether they will like a movie.
In this case, peer feedback should have a stronger impact on their choices.
To test this prediction, I estimate models of the form
lnyjt = 0 + 1t + 2(t  Sj) + 3(t  precisionj) + 4(t  Sj  precisionj) + dj + ujt (21)
where precisionj is a measure of the precision of the prior for movie j. The coecient of
interest is the coecient on the triple interaction between the time trend, the surprise and
the precision of the prior, 4, which is predicted to be negative in the presence of social
learning. It is important to note that, unlike equation 18, this model does not compare
movies with positive and negative surprise. Instead, for a given surprise, this model tests
whether the eect of the surprise is systematically associated with precision of the prior.
To empirically identify which movies have precise priors and which have diuse priors,
I propose two measures. First, I use a dummy for sequels. It is reasonable to expect that
consumers have more precise priors for sequels than non-sequels. For example, after having
seen the movie \Rocky", consumers are likely to have a more precise idea of whether they
will like its sequel \Rocky II." Second, to generalize this idea, I calculate the variance of
the rst week surprise in box oce sales by genre. Genres with large variance in rst week
surprise are characterized by more quality uncertainty and therefore consumers should have
more diuse priors on their quality. Indeed, sequels are the genre with the second smallest
variance in rst week surprise.25
Table 7 indicates that the data are consistent with the prediction of the model. In column
1, the coecient on the triple interaction is negative and statistically signicant. Consider
two movies, identical except for the fact that the rst is a sequel and the second is not.
Suppose that they both have the same positive surprise in rst week sales. The estimates in
25The genre with the smallest variance is Western. The genre with the largest variance is Action.
25column 1 implies that the surprise has more impact on the rate of decline of the second than
the rst, presumably because the additional information provided by the surprise matters
less for the sequel. Quantitatively, the rate of decline of sales of the second movie implied by
column 1 is -.63, while the rate of decline of the rst movie is -.81. In other words, consistent
with the social learning hypothesis, the same positive surprise benets sales of the second
movie signicantly more.
In column 2, I use the variance in rst week surprise. In this case, we expect the coecient
on the triple interaction to be positive, since higher variance means a less precise prior.
Indeed, this is the case empirically.
6.3 Prediction 3: Size of the Social Network
Prediction 3 indicates that social learning should be stronger for consumers who have a
larger social network, since these consumers receive more precise feedback from their peers
than consumers with small social networks. While I do not have direct information on the
size of the social network, it seems plausible to assume that teenagers have a more developed
social network than older adults. Social learning should therefore be more important for
teen movies. To test this prediction, I estimate models of the form
lnyjt = 0 + 1t + 2(t  Sj) + 3(t  teenj) + 4(t  Sj  teenj) + dj + ujt (22)
where teenj is an indicator variable for whether the movie's target audience is teenagers. Here
the coecient of interest is the coecient on the triple interaction, 4, which is predicted to
be positive in the presence of social learning. Like equation 21, this model does not compare
movies with positive and negative surprises. Instead, for a given surprise, this model tests
whether the eect of the surprise is larger for teen movies.
Estimates in column 1 of Table 8 are consistent with Prediction 3. The coecient on the
triple interaction is indeed positive, indicating that a positive surprise has a larger impact
on rate of decline of sales for teen movies than non-teen movies.
A related approach uses the size of the movie release. The precision of the feedbacks that
consumers receive from friends should be larger for movies opening in many theaters than
for movies opening in few theaters. For example, a positive surprise for a movie that opens
in 2,000 theaters should generate a more precise signal and therefore more updating than an
identically sized surprise for a movie that opens only in 20 theaters. To test this hypothesis,
in column 2 of Table 8 I estimate the following model
lnyjt = 0 + 1t + 2(t  Sj) + 3(t  screensj) + 4(t  Sj  screensj) + dj + ujt (23)
where screensj is the number of screens in which the movie opened. The expectation is
that 4 is positive. Consistent with the hypothesis, the coecient on the triple interaction
in column 2 of Table 8 is positive.
266.4 Prediction 4: Does Learning Decline Over Time?
Prediction 4 in section 3 involves the time path of the diusion of information. It indicates
that in the presence of social learning a positive surprise movie should generate a concave
sales prole, and a negative surprise movie should generate a convex sales prole. To test
this prediction, I estimate the following model:
lnyjt = 0 + 1t + 2t2 + 3(t  1(Sj > 0)) + 4(t2  1(Sj > 0)) + dj + ujt
where 1(Sj > 0) is a dummy for positive surprise movies. If it is empirically the case
that the sale prole is concave for positive surprise movies, I should nd that the second
derivative is negative: 2(2 +4) < 0. Similarly, if the prole is convex for negative surprise
movies, I should nd that the second derivative is positive: 22 > 0.
My estimates are indeed consistent with this prediction. Point estimates and standard
errors are as follows: 1: -1.88 (.051); 2: .089 (.006); 3: 1.38 (.060); 4: -.110 (.007). R2
is .79. Statistical tests conrm that the curvature for positive surprise movies is concave
and the curvature for negative surprise movies is convex. A test of the hypothesis that
2(2 + 4) < 0 has p-value = 0.0001. A test of the hypothesis that 22 > 0 also has p-value
= 0.0001.
7 Alternative Interpretations
Overall, the evidence in the previous section is consistent with the hypothesis that the
diusion of information through social learning signicantly aects consumers' purchasing
decisions. The rate of decline of sales for movies with positive surprise is much slower than
the rate of decline of movies with negative surprise. This nding does not appear to be driven
only by omitted variables. For example, this nding is not due to endogenous changes in
advertising expenditures or critic reviews in the weeks after the opening. Similarly, this
nding cannot be explained by endogenous changes in the number of screens devoted to a
movie, because it is robust to using per-screen sales as the dependent variable instead of
sales.
Moreover, if this nding were only due to omitted variables, we would not necessarily
observe the comparative static results based on precision of the prior and size of the social
network. The eect of a surprise appears more pronounced when consumers have diuse
priors on movie quality and less pronounced when consumers have strong priors, as in the
case of sequels. The eect of a surprise is also larger for movies that target audiences with
larger social networks. Moreover, the amount of learning appears to decline over time. This
fact is also consistent with the social learning hypothesis.
In this Section, I discuss three possible alternative explanations of the evidence. First, I
discuss the possibility that the utility of watching a movie depends on the number of peers
who have seen the movie. This type of network eect may occur if, for example, consumers
draw utility from talking about a movie with their friends, and that utility is increasing in
27the number of friends who have seen the movie.26 I use prediction 5 to shed some light
on the importance of network eects. Second, I discuss whether the nding that positive
surprise movies experience a slower rate of decline in sales than negative surprise movies
may be explained by delayed consumer responses. Finally, I discuss the role of competitors.
Network Eects and Prediction 5. It is very dicult to distinguish social learning
from the case where a consumer's utility of watching a movie depends both on the quality
of the movie and on the number of peers who have seen the movie or plan to see the movie.
Consider for example the evidence in Table 2. A movie with a positive surprise in week 1
may attract more viewers in week 2 not because of learning, but because marginal consumers
in week 2 realize that a larger than expected number of their friends have seen the movie,
making the movie more valuable to them. Moreover, if utility of watching a movie is a
function of the expected number of friends who will ever see the movie, the network eects
story is consistent not only with Table 2 but also with the comparative statics in sub-section
6.2. A consumer who uses the normal learning model to update her predictions on how many
peers will ever see the movie should be more aected by a surprise in week 1 when she has
a diuse prior relative to the case when she has a precise prior.
This alternative interpretation is dicult to distinguish from social learning, and I cannot
completely rule it out. However, I provide a simple test based on Prediction 5 in Section
3 that sheds some light on the relevance of this interpretation. Specically, I test whether
consumers respond to surprises in rst week sales that are orthogonal to movie quality, like
weather shocks. Under social learning, lower than expected demand in week 1 due to bad
weather should have no signicant impact on sales in the following weeks, because demand
shocks driven by weather do not reect movie quality. On the other hand, under the network
eects hypothesis, lower than expected demand in week one caused by bad weather should
still lower sales in the following weeks. If a consumer draws utility from talking about a
movie with friends, she cares about how many friends have seen a movie, irrespective of
their reasons for choosing to see it.
To implement this test, I estimate equation 18 by 2SLS, where I instrument Sj using
weather in the opening weekend. By using weather as an instrument, I isolate the variation
in surprise that only comes from weather shocks. This variation is arguably independent of
the quality of a movie. The coecient of interest is 2. The network hypothesis predicts
that 2 > 0. By contrast, the social learning hypothesis predicts that 2 = 0.
A major limitation of my data is that it only includes information on nation-wide sales.
However, as it turns out, it is possible to predict rst week surprise at the national level
using weather conditions in 7 large cities: New York, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Atlanta,
26Becker (1991) proposes a model of network eects where the demand for a good by a person depends
positively on the aggregate quantity demanded of the good. He hypothesizes that \the pleasure from some
goods is greater when many people want to consume it."
28Kansans City and Detroit.27 In general, rain, snow and colder temperatures in these 7 cities
are associated with signicantly lower rst week demand and signicantly lower rst week
surprise.
Results are shown in Table 9. The rst row corresponds to a specication where Sj is the
surprise of movie j, while the second row corresponds to a specication where Sj is a dummy
for whether the surprise of movie j is positive. Column 1 reports the baseline OLS estimates
for the sample for which I have non-missing temperature data for all 7 cities. These estimates
are very similar to the corresponding estimates for the full sample. Column 2 reports instru-
mental variables estimates where instruments include minimum and maximum temperature
on the opening day and the day before the opening day. It is possible that the eect of
temperature is nonlinear. For example, when it is cold, we expect higher temperatures to
be associated with higher sales, but when it is hot, we expect higher temperatures to lower
sales. For this reason, in column 3 instruments also include the squares of minimum and
maximum temperature on the opening day and the day before. In column 4, instruments
include minimum and maximum temperature as well as precipitation and snowfall on the
opening day and the day before. In column 5, instruments include minimum and maximum
temperature, precipitation, and snowfall, on the opening day and the day before, as well
as these variables squared. Surprise is dened as the deviation of sales from expected sales
based on number of screens. The last row in Table 9 corresponds to a test of whether the
weather variables are jointly signicant in the rst stage. While only some of the rst stage
coecients are individually signicant, taken together they are statistically signicant. Tests
for whether the rst stage coecients are jointly equal to 0 have p-values below 0.0001 in
all 4 columns, although the F test statistics are low.
Comparison of columns 1 and 2 indicates that the coecient on the surpriset interaction
drops from .413 to -.107, while the coecient on the positive surprise dummyt interaction
drops from .643 to -.277. The corresponding coecients in column 2 are .085 and .123 and
are not statistically signicant. Column 3 and 4 display similar results. Not surprisingly,
the IV estimates are considerably less precise than the OLS estimates, most likely because
I can not perform the analysis at the city-level. For this reason it is dicult to draw rm
conclusions. However, the small, insignicant and often wrong-signed point estimates in
columns 2-5 suggest that network eects cannot fully explain the large eects documented
in Table 2.
One concern is that weather might be serially correlated. Because my measure of sales
is for the weekend, this is unlikely to be a serious concern. Indeed, when I measure serial
correlation in temperature, snow or precipitation in my 7 cities, I nd that weather is not
correlated with weather 7 days earlier.28
27Dahl and Della Vigna (2007) are the rst to document that weather in selected cities shifts aggregate
movie sales.
28Positive serial correlation would induce a positive bias into IV estimates, biasing the test in favor of the
network hypothesis.
29Delayed Consumer Response. It is in theory possible that the patterns in Table 2 are
explained by a slow adjustment of consumers to the innovation represented by the surprise.
Consider for example a positive surprise movie, and assume that there is a fraction of con-
sumers who cannot immediately go when a new movie is released but have already decided
to see the lm in later weeks. In this case the positive surprise movie would experience a
slower rate of decline in sales even in the absence of social learning.
However, while this explanation could in theory generate the patterns documented in
Table 2, it is not consistent with the comparative statics on precision of the prior and the
signal documented below in sub-sections 6.2 and 6.3. In the absence of social learning there
is no reason why we should see that the eect of the surprise is systematically associated
with the precision of the prior or the size of the social network.
Competitors. Movies rarely open alone. Often there are 2 or 3 movies opening in the
same weekend. As documented by Einav (2003 and 2007), the competitors a movie faces are
not random, but are determined strategically by the studios. The fact that competitors are
not random does not pose a problem for my estimation. The number of screens allocated
to a given movie should incorporate the best prediction of demand given its competitors.
A movie facing a competitor that is expected to be strong will have a smaller number of
screens than a movie facing a competitor expected to be weak. Thus, while competitors are
not random, the deviation from market expectations is arguably random.
One might still be concerned that a positive surprise competitor might mechanically
induce a negative surprise for a given movie. While this is likely, this mechanism alone
would not generate the increased divergence in sales over time between positive surprise
movies and negative surprise movies documented in section 6. It would simply result in
a parallel shift in sales, without necessarily aecting the rate of decline. Moreover, this
mechanism alone would not generate the comparative statics in sections 6.2 and 6.3.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper makes two contributions. Substantively, I show that social learning is an
important determinant of sales in the movie industry. Social learning makes successful movies
more successful and unsuccessful movies more unsuccessful. Consistent with a simple model
where consumers update their priors based on their peers' purchasing decisions, the rate of
decline of movies with stronger than expected rst week demand is about half the rate of
decline of movies with weaker than expected rst week demand.
While I cannot completely rule out alternative explanations, the weight of the evidence
is consistent with the social learning hypothesis. As the model predicts, the eect of a
surprise on subsequent sales is smaller for movies for which consumers have strong priors
and larger for movies for which consumers have more diuse priors. Additionally, the eect
30of a surprise is more pronounced for groups of consumers who have more developed social
networks. Finally, consumers do not seem to respond to surprises caused by factors that are
orthogonal to movie quality, like weather shocks.
Quantitatively, social learning appears to have an important eect on prots in the
movie industry. When I use my estimates to quantify the amount of sales generated by
social learning, I nd that for the typical movie with positive surprise, social learning raises
box-oce sales by $5.8 million{or about 38% of total revenues{relative to the case of a movie
that has similar quality but where consumers do not communicate.29 The existence of this
large \social multiplier" indicates that the elasticity of aggregate movie demand to movie
quality is signicantly larger than the elasticity of individual demand to quality.
The second contribution of the paper is methodological. This paper shows that it is pos-
sible to identify social interactions using aggregate data and intuitive comparative statics. In
situations where individual-level data and exogenous variation in peer group attributes are
not available, this approach is a credible alternative methodology for identifying spillovers
and social interactions. For example, this approach can be applied to the study of informa-
tional spillovers in the demand of many other goods or in technology adoption.
29This number is obtained as follows. Equation 18 indicates that over the lifetime of a movie, the eect
of a positive surprise on sales is
P8
t=2 ^ 2 S t salest, where the summation does not include the rst week
(t=1), as learning begins only after the opening week; ^ 2 = :463 is the coecient in column 2 of Table 2;
salest represents average sales in week t for a movie with no surprise; and S represents the surprise for the
typical positive or negative surprise movie. (For simplicity, in these calculations I ignore the non-linearity
uncovered in subsection 6.4.) For the typical positive surprise movie{that is, the one at the 75th percentile
of the surprise distribution, with sales 46% above expectations{social learning accounts for $5.8 million in
additional sales. For the typical negative surprise movie{that is, the one at the 25th percentile of the surprise
distribution, with sales 41% below expectations{social learning accounts for $5.2 million in lost sales.
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34Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1)
Weekend Sales (million) 1.78
(4.37)
Weekend Sales in Opening Weekend (million) 4.54
(8.15)
Production Costs (million) 16.88
(.81)
Number of Screens 449.6
(696.9)






















Number of Movies 4992
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Dollar gures are in 2005 dollars. The sample
includes 4,992 movies that opened between 1982 and 2000. Each of these movies is observed
for 8 weeks. Total sample size is 39936. Sample size for reviews and TV advertising are 5064
and 14840, respectively.
35Table 2: Decline in Box Oce Sales by Opening Weekend Surprise
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t -.926 -.926 -1.258
(.012) (.011) (.017)
t  Surprise .463
(.016)
t  Positive Surprise .616
(.022)
t  Bottom Surprise -1.320
(.019)
t  Middle Surprise -.984
(.020)
t  Top Surprise -.474
(.017)
R-squared 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by movie and displayed in parentheses. Each column
reports estimates of variants of equation 18. The dependent variable is log weekly box oce
sales. All models include movie xed eects. Surprise refers to deviation from predicted rst
weekend sales. By construction, surprise has mean 0. In column 4, \bottom surprise" is an
indicator for whether the movie belongs to the bottom tercile of the surprise distribution
(most negative surprise). Similarly, \middle surprise" and \ top surprise" are indicators
for whether the movie belongs to the middle or top (most positive) tercile of the surprise
distribution, respectively. Sample size is 39,936.
36Table 3: Distribution of Movie-Specic Speed of Decline in Box Oce Sales over Time, by
Opening Weekend Surprise
Movies with Movies with
Positive Surprise Negative Surprise
(1) (2)
5% -2.30 -2.66
10 % -1.78 -2.47
25 % -.96 -1.91
Median -.41 -1.23
75 % -.11 -.60
90 % .15 -.19
95 % .26 .00
Notes: Entries represent the distribution of the parameter 1j in equation 19 for movies that
experienced a positive rst weekend surprise and for movies that experienced a negative
rst weekend surprise. There are 4,992 such coecients, one for each movie. The two
distributions are shown graphically in Figure 5.
37Table 4: The Eect of Controlling for Advertisement and Reviews
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1: Advertising Baseline Baseline Controlling
Full Sample Partial Sample for Advertising
t -.926 -1.258 -.940 1.320 -.996 1.329
(.011) (.017) (.025) (.048) (.024) (.048)
t  Surprise .463 .700 .661
(.016) (.036) (.036)
t  Positive Surprise .616 .777 .730
(.022) (.054) (.053)
log Advertising .908 1.108
(.136) (.176)
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.79 .81 .80
N 39936 39936 5064 5064 5064 5064
Panel 2: Reviews Baseline Baseline Controlling
Full Sample Partial Sample for Reviews
t -.926 -1.258 -.891 1.232 -.943 1.279
(.011) (.017) (.018) (.029) (.018) (.029)
t  Surprise .463 .543 .534
(.016) (.026) (.025)
t  Positive Surprise .616 .660 .649
(.022) (.037) (.036)
Favorable Reviews 5.114 5.184
(.408) (.437)
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 .80 .79
N 39936 39936 14840 14840 14840 14840
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by movie and displayed in parentheses. The dependent
variable is log weekly box oce sales. Columns 1 and 2 report baseline estimates (reproduced
from columns 2 and 3 of Table 2). Columns 3 and 4 report estimates of the same models
obtained using the sample for which data on advertising (top panel) or movie reviews (bottom
panel) are available. Columns 5 and 6 include controls for advertising (top panel) and reviews
(bottom panel) and are based on the same sample used for columns 3 and 4. Log TV
advertising is the logarithm of cumulative expenditures for all television ads (network, cable
and others) until the relevant week. Favorable reviews is the fraction of positive reviews
among all the reviews published until the relevant week. All models include movie xed
eects.
38Table 5: Decline in Box Oce Sales by Opening Week Surprise - Tests of Supply Eects
Baseline Dependent Var. is Drop Sold-Out Movies
Sales Per Screens
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t -.926 -1.258 -.654 -.805 -.966 -1.28
(.011) (.017) (.006) (.010) (.011) (.017)
t  Surprise .463 .211 .461
(.016) (.009) (.017)
t  Positive Surprise .616 .281 .592
(.022) (.013) (.023)
N 39,936 39,936 39,936 39,936 38,384 38,384
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by movie and displayed in parenthesis. Each column
reports estimates of variants of equation 18. Column 1 and 2 are baseline estimates from
Table 2. In columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is weekly log box oce sales per screen.
Models in column 5 and 6 are estimated on the sub-sample that does not include movies
that are in the top 5% in terms of sales per screen in the rst weekend.
39Table 6: Robustness of the Estimated Eect of Surprise to the Inclusion of Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel 1
Model 1
t  Surprise .422 .424 .420 .416 .445 .433 .463
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.015) (.016) (.016)
Model 2
t  Positive Surprise .672 .666 .659 .646 .585 .561 .616
(.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022)
Surprise Equation Controls For:
Genre Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ratings Y Y Y Y Y
Production Cost Y Y Y Y
Distributor Y Y Y




t  Surprise .422 .422 .425 .427 .444 .433 .473
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.015) (.015) (.014)
Model 4
t  Positive Surprise .672 .671 .673 .674 .684 .666 .711
(.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022)
Sales Equation Controls For:
t  Genre Y Y Y Y Y Y
t  Ratings Y Y Y Y Y
t  Production Cost Y Y Y Y
t  Distributor Y Y Y
t  Weekday, Month Y Y
t  Year Y
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by movie and displayed in parentheses. Each entry is a separate
regression. In panel 1, each entry is an estimate of the parameter 2 in equation 18, where the denition of
surprises varies across columns. Surprise refers to deviation from predicted rst week sales, where predicted
rst week sales are obtained using the number of screens as a predictor and an increasing number of controls,
as specied at the bottom of the panel. Column 7 reports baseline estimates from the denition of surprise
used in Table 2. Panel 2 reports estimates of equation 20, where an increasing number of controls are added
to the sales equation, as specied at the bottom of the panel. In this panel, surprise is dened using only
the number of screens as predictor. All models include movie xed eects. Sample size is 39,936.







t  Pos. Surprise .627 -.789
(.023) (.431)
t  Sequel .015
(.075)
t  Pos. Surpr.  Sequel -.190
(.096)
t  Variance .156
(.445)
t  Pos. Surpr.  Variance 2.003
(.612)
R-squared 0.79 0.79
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by movie and displayed in parentheses. Each column
reports estimates of variants of equation 21. The dependent variable is log weekly box
oce sales. In column 1, precision of the prior is measured by sequel status. Movies that
are sequels are expected to have more precise priors. In column 2, precision of the prior
is measured by the variance of the rst weekend surprise in box oce sales. Genres with
a larger variance are expected to have less precise priors. All models include movie xed
eects. Sample size is 39,936.
41Table 8: Decline in Box Oce Sales, by Opening Weekend Surprise and Precision of Peers'
Signal





t  Positive Surprise .576 .568
(.029) (.028)
t  Teen Movie -.224
(.034)
t  Positive Surprise  Teen Movie .091
(.046)
t  Screens -.133
(.024)
t  Positive Surprise  Screens .094
(.028)
R-squared 0.79 0.79
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by movie and displayed in parentheses. The dependent
variable is log weekly box oce sales. Column 1 reports an estimate of equation 22, where
\Teen Movie" is an indicator equal to one if the intended audience is teenagers, based on
detailed genre. Teenagers are expected to have a larger social network and therefore more
social learning. Column 2 reports an estimate of equation 23, where \Screens" is the number
of screens in the opening weekend. Movies with a larger number of screens are expected to
send a more precise signal. Number of screens is divided by 1,000 to make the reported
coecients easier to read. All models include movie xed eects. Sample size is 39,936.
42Table 9: Test of the Network Hypothesis
OLS 2SLS
IV is min temp., IV is min temp.,
max temp. max temp.,
precip., snow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
t  Surprise .413 -.107 .085 -.039 .118
(.014) (.122) (.083) (.093) (.067)
t  Positive Surprise .643 -.277 .123 -.129 .181
(.025) (.235) (.152) (.184) (.125)
F-Test: First Stage Coe.=0 3.54 3.07 2.82 2.60
p-value .000 .000 .000 .000
N 31528 31528 31528 30320 30320
Weather Enters Linearly y y
Quadratic in Weather y y
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by movie and displayed in parentheses. Each entry is a separate regression and represents an
estimate of the parameter 2 in equation 18. The dependent variable is log weekly box oce sales. Column 1 reports OLS estimates
based on the sample for which I have data on maximum and minimum temperature. Column 2 reports instrumental variables estimates
where instruments include minimum and maximum temperature on the opening day and the day before the opening day in 7 metropolitan
areas. In column 3, instruments include minimum and maximum temperature on the opening day and the day before the opening day
as well as these variables squared. In column 4, instruments include minimum and maximum temperature, precipitation and snowfall
on the opening day and the day before the opening day. In column 5, instruments include minimum and maximum temperature,
precipitation and snowfall on the opening day and the day before the opening day as well as these variables squared. Surprise is dened
based on number of screens. Sample size varies because data on weather are missing for some cities in some days.
4
3Appendix Table A1: Regression of First Weekend Box Oce Sales on Number
of Screens and Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Screens .892 .895 .882 .870 .802 .806 .813
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.006)
R-squared 0.907 .908 .909 .912 932 .936 .937
Genre Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ratings Y Y Y Y Y
Production Cost Y Y Y Y
Distributor Y Y Y
Weekday, Month, Week Y Y
Year Y
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of opening
weekend box oce sales. There are 16 dummies for genre; 8 dummies for ratings; 273
dummies for distributor; 18 dummies for year; 6 dummies for weekday; 11 dummies for
month; 51 dummies for week. Sample size is 4,992.




5% -1.21 Tarzan and the Lost City; Big Bully; The Fourth War
10 % -.87 Tom & Jerry ; The Phantom of the Opera; Born to Be Wild
25 % -.41 Home Alone 3; Pinocchio; Miracle on 34th Street
Median .02 Highlander 3; The Bonre of the Vanities; Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas
75 % .46 Alive; Autumn in New York; House Party
90 % .84 The Muse; Sister Act; Forrest Gump; Tarzan
95 % 1.08 Breakin; Ghostbusters; The Silence of the Lambs
Notes: Entries represent the distribution of surprises (in percent terms) in opening weekend
box oce sales. For example, the entry for 75% indicates that opening weekend sales for
the movie at the 75th percentile are 46% higher than expected. Mean surprise is 0 by
construction.

































With Strong Social Learning

















































Notes: The top panel plots average box oce sales (in millions of dollars) by week. The
bottom panel plots average log box oce sales by week. The sample includes 4,992 movies.
Sale gures are in 2005 dollars.
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Notes: The Figure plots average log box oce sales by week for movies that experienced
a positive rst weekend surprise and for movies that experienced a negative rst weekend
surprise. Sales are in 2005 dollars. The sample includes 4,992 movies.
49Figure 5: Distribution of Movie-Specic Speed of Decline in Box Oce Sales over Time, by
Opening Weekend Surprise
beta
 positive  negative




Notes: The Figure shows the distribution of the coecient 1j in equation 19, for movies
that experienced a positive rst weekend surprise and for movies that experienced a negative
rst weekend surprise. In other words, it shows the distribution of the slope coecient from
4,992 regressions of log box oce sales on a time trend, by surprise. Percentiles of the two
distributions are reported in Table 3.
50